This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.
norms. This can favour socially responsible behaviour, particularly if people feel ashamed to voice self-centred arguments. 2 So channels allowing verbal communication may increase the social responsibility of individuals in groups and therefore of groups.
Control structures also affect social preferences. First, the allocation of control rights affects the level of organisational communication (e.g. consensus-based horizontal structures require intensive communication between insiders), so the previous paragraph applies. Second, organisational structures affect social relations, because actors tend to identify with and care for those to whom they feel similar. In a horizontal structure where insiders have identical roles, their mutual identification or sense of group identity is particularly high and implies a low relative concern for outsiders. 3 (This "insideroutsider" effect is exacerbated by communication. 4 
)
Even when expanded to allow for altruism or to capture fairness concerns, simple game-theoretic models do not permit clear predictions of why the process for decisionmaking should affect ethical outcomes. We apply the modelling techniques of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and discuss Rabin (1995) . 5 Heterogeneity in fairness concerns or altruism can lead to interesting interactions involving moral suasion, threats and signalling, but to draw clear predictions we rely on the above social psychology ideas with preferences that depend on decision processes as well as material consequences.
We derive two main predictions. (1) With unrestricted insider communication, vertical firms are more ethical (less likely to harm outsiders) than horizontal firms because: (a) the central decision-maker's responsibility is not diffused; (b) subordinates can use voice to apply influence and therefore feel responsible; (c) subordinates identify less with their superiors and more with the third party outsider. (2) Communication raises 2 See Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990) on the power of norms to generate pro-social behaviour. In our setting, most norms (efficiency, fairness, etc.) encourage generosity to the third party (though we discuss self-interest norms in the conclusion). Norms should certainly benefit the third party if actors prefer to make more virtuous statements than average (see Brown (1986) on "social comparison theory"). See also the Habermasian approach to corporate social responsibility (e.g. Palazzo and Scherer (2007) ). 3 Sims (1992) extends Janis and Mann's (1977) concept of "groupthink" to explain unethical behaviour in tightly-knit groups; see evidence below and see Brewer (1979) and Tajfel (1970) on how simple distinctions can shift categorisation between in-and out-groups. 4 Caporeal et al. (1989) show that discussion often enhances initial group distinctions. 5 In our simple setting the related models of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Charness and Rabin (2002) , and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2004) generate similar predictions. the average social responsibility of vertically-structured firms, since it ensures that subordinates feel involved and facilitates social pressure. 6 We put these ideas to a test using a simple three-player game that captures, in a very stylised way, the type of dilemma faced by a firm when its profit-maximising strategy causes harm to third parties. In our experiment, two of the three subjects jointly determine the "firm's" production strategy, while the third subject is a passive "third party" with no power to respond (not even voice). In experimental terminology, the third party is a dummy and the firm plays a variant on the "dictator game". 7 Our control structure treatments vary how the firm's two insiders determine its strategy. In our horizontal structure, the firm's control rights are allocated symmetrically between the insiders: they decide the firm's strategy by consensus. In our vertical structure, the firm has a boss who sets the production strategy; the subordinate cannot change the strategy, but can prevent production by quitting. (E.g. the subordinate might have critical human capital or the "quit" could represent "blowing the whistle" on an illegal productive practice.) The boss cannot affect the share of profits between him/herself and the subordinate; in all our experimental treatments, the firm's insiders each receive half the profits. The exogeneity of the sharing rule isolates the shared ethical dilemma over how to treat the outsider. It also has direct relevance, because insiders do not renegotiate profit-sharing every time their firm faces a strategic decision. (See also section 2.)
Our main results are two-fold. First, with unrestricted insider communication, vertical structures favour more ethical outcomes: the insiders of a vertically structured firm are less likely to harm outsiders than are the insiders of a horizontally structured firm. Second, the communication channel between subordinates and superiors is vital for this ethical result; communication significantly increases the ethical nature of vertical structures; without communication, vertical structures are no more ethical than horizontal ones. We also report on the dynamics of bargaining, the verbal statements sent in communication treatments and the time needed to reach agreement. For instance, we find 6 Communication has an ambiguous impact on horizontal firms, because verbal communication catalyses bonding between insiders thereby raising the exclusionary insider-outsider effect (see above). 7 The firm's problem differs slightly from the dictator game in that: (i) the pie size is not fixed (initially, it increases when the harm level is reduced); (ii) the firm has a non-production option that reduces the pie but avoids harming the dummy. These differences reflect common aspects of real-world production settings and ensure that efficiency norms prescribe the same generous play as standard fairness norms. that the insider proposing the most generous strategy is quicker to compromise downwards (as if letting the less ethical partner take responsibility) than is the less ethical partner to compromise upwards. This dynamic "responsibility-alleviation" disappears when the insiders can communicate verbally, consistent with the idea that people like to use voice to argue for virtuous behaviour (see footnote 2). We also confirm the simple intuition that decision-making delays are greater in horizontal structures, but we find that adding a communication channel largely removes this disadvantage.
The paper is organised into six sections. In the next section, we describe the related experimental work that motivates our conjectures and our design. In section 3, we present a model to formalise the conjectures. We detail the experimental procedures in section 4. We present our results in section 5 and conclude with a discussion in section 6.
Related Experimental Literature
Psychological considerations. Milgram's (1974) studies offer early evidence on how involvement in decision-making affects perceived responsibility: subjects were dramatically more likely to reject their unethical task when they were involved in selecting the degree of harm (the size of the electric shock) and when physically involved in creating the harm (placing the hand on the electric plate). Feelings of responsibility also appear to be weaker when an actor's involvement is low relative to that of others (especially when the others appear to be legitimate "authorities" as in Milgram (1963 and 1974) ). Charness (2000) defines "responsibility-alleviation" as a "shift of [moral] responsibility to an external authority" and gives evidence that a worker in a giftexchange game is more pro-social when no other human actor has an active role; 8 he also notes that much of the evidence that external controls can reduce intrinsic motivation can be interpreted in terms of responsibility-alleviation (see e.g. Barkema (1995 ), Campbell (1935 , Deci and Ryan (1985) and Frey and Jegen (2001)).
The evidence on responsibility-diffusion (see Darley and Latané (1968) and Latané and Nida (1981) ) bolsters our general claim about control and responsibility, because sharing control decreases each individual's (absolute and relative) control. The recent literature comparing group to individual behaviour in games is broadly consistent.
For instance, Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) and Robert and Carnevale (1997) find that groups make less generous offers in the ultimatum game; Schopler and Insko (1992) find that groups are more competitive; Cox (2002) finds that groups are less trustworthy in the investment game; Bosman, Hennig-Schmidt and van Winden (2005) find that groups rarely discuss fairness considerations in the power-to-take game. Dana, Weber and Kuang (2005) find that groups are less generous in the dictator game, unlike Cason and Mui's (1997) earlier finding that groups are more generous (as discussed immediately below). Dana et al. (2005) also find that dictators are less generous when a random factor reduces their direct control over outcomes; the random factor appears to alleviate individual responsibility, just as random factors reduce the responsibility attributed to others in Blount's (1995) experiment. In sum, this work suggests that actors feel more involved and hold themselves more responsible for outcomes over which they have more direct and salient control (relative to others and to random effects).
There are fewer related experimental papers on communication. It is intuitive that communication with the third party should limit unkindness to this party -see e.g. Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Greiner, Güth and Zultan (2006) . Less is known about the impact of internal communication on how groups treat outsiders. Cason and Mui (1997) extend Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith's (1994) notion of the "observer effect" (behaving more sociably in pursuit of observers' approval) to the case of mutual observation by group members. The free-form communication between group members (who meet face-to-face in Cason and Mui (1997) but not in Dana et al. (2005) ) enhances the perceived proximity of these observers (see Sally (1995) ), so the observer effect could explain the greater generosity of groups in Cason and Mui (1997) . Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) discuss how communication may enhance general norms of benevolence, but end up concurring with Dawes et al.'s (1990) conclusion that discussions mostly serve to enhance group identity and allow parties to elicit commitments to contribute. However, these papers study team games where discussion affects individual contributions to the group as well as the inter-group strategy; see Bornstein's (2003) recent survey. Other recent advances in understanding the role of communication study strategic bilateral games; e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg (forthcoming) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) find that communication facilitates commitments that can resolve trust problems and Cooper and Kagel (2005) and Brandts and Cooper (2006) find that communication facilitates coordination.
Related Designs.
Most experiments (and, to the best of our knowledge, all prior variants on the dictator game) adopt horizontal rules for aggregating individual choices. Our vertical structure is similar to the group-with-a-dictator structure adopted in recent work on representatives (see e.g. Bornstein, Schram and Sonnemans (2006) on the 2-stage chicken game), but it is less extreme, because subordinates are not entirely powerlessthey can quit (which is why their ethical stance always matters). 9 We know of two other papers that compare decision-aggregation rules. In Messick, Allison and Samuelson's (1988) ultimatum game, recipient group responses are set at either the maximum or minimum of the individual proposals. In both these treatments, the groups are horizontal, but Bornstein et al. (2006) compare dictatorial representatives (extreme vertical groups) with democratic groups (where the three members make proposals and then select by majority vote). Bornstein et al. (2006) observe no decision-rule effects at the group-level; their underlying (2-stage chicken) game always triggers strategic conflict rather than ethical considerations. 10 Finally, Potters, Sefton and van der Heijden (2005) explicitly study the impact of hierarchy, but they look at productive efficiency and not group ethics; furthermore, they define hierarchy by the asymmetric allocation of team profits; i.e. they vary cash-flow rights while we vary control rights. In sum, we believe this paper is the first to analyse the impact of organisational structure on ethical behaviour.
Theoretical framework and predictions

Set-up
In all treatments, an independent set of actors play a three-player game. Two of the players, A and B are active. One player, C, has no decisions to take. A and B are the "insiders" of a "firm" whose production generates an externality on the third player C "outside" the firm. The firm's production plan 0 10 y ≤ ≤ generates profits 10 y − and an externality of1.2 Min{6, } 6 y × − ; y is effectively the firm's expenditure on mitigating the -6 production externality. Notice that the marginal return on harm-reduction (y) is decreasing: it falls from 1.2 to 0 at 6 y = . Notice also that 1.2 Min{ , 6} 6 0 y × − > for 6 10 y ≤ ≤ ; i.e. the firm can choose a plan that benefits the outsider (e.g. by decontaminating others' pollution or because non-production triggers entry by a harmful competitor). This is not important to our results, but it allows us to distinguish among alternative ethical motivations. 
The decision-making process
The decision-making process has two components: setting the strategic plan y and deciding whether to implement it. Our organisational treatments only affect the process for setting the plan. In all treatments, both A and B can unilaterally prevent implementation (production). 11 What varies is the decision-making process that determines the firm's plan, y. We consider horizontal and vertical structures. We also control the communication structure that complements the formal decision process.
• Horizontal structures
The basic property of a horizontal structure is that the power to select y is distributed symmetrically between (the insiders) A and B. We study the horizontal structure in which quits, the game ends in no agreement and there is no production.
• Vertical structures
In the vertical structure, the power to set y is distributed asymmetrically: A sets y unilaterally; B can only reject A's decision by quitting. Here the timing is very simple:
(1) A sets { } 0,1, 2,...,10 y ∈ or chooses to quit; (2) B chooses whether or not to quit; (3) Production plan y is implemented unless either A or B chose to quit.
• Communication structures
In the horizontal structure, A and B can use proposals during early rounds of bargaining to signal their preferences, but organisations often permit much richer communication.
We therefore compare the games implied by the above structures with the enhanced games in which A and B can send each other written (electronic) messages throughout their interaction. 13
Labelling. We refer to the four games as H, V, HwC and VwC where H and V denote
Horizontal and Vertical structures and wC denotes "with Chat/Communication).
Theoretical predictions
We begin by considering homogeneous insiders with consequentialist preferences. Then we allow for heterogeneity and then we consider preferences that depend on the decisionmaking process. We focus on this last issue (psychological considerations), since it generates the clearest predictions. Recall that in all vertical treatments, A is the superior and B is the subordinate.
• Equilibrium with homogeneous consequentialist preferences
Homogeneity implies that the two insiders have the same type of preference function.
Since they have identical material payoffs, their preferences over outcomes are identical.
The firm always implements the commonly preferred strategy, since it is trivial to propose and agree on this commonly known strategy. Furthermore, under the standard assumption of consequentialism, the decision process has no effect on this preferred strategy, so outcomes are independent of our treatments.
Hypothesis 0a:
If actors are homogenous and have consequentialist preferences then, in equilibrium, structure (horizontal, H, or vertical, V) and communication (with chat, wC, or without) make no difference to outcomes: H = V = HwC = VwC.
For future reference, we record the exact outcomes predicted by common preference functions (restricting for simplicity to utility functions that are quasi-linear in money).
(i) Egoists (standard, purely self-interested actors) set 0 y = (and do not quit).
(ii) Utilitarians maximise the sum of monetary payoffs, so they set 6 y = .
(iii) Egalitarians would set 7.6 y = , but round to 7 y = or 8 under our integer restriction.
(iv) Rawlsians set 6 y = ; this maximises the minimum of the three payoffs.
(v) Moral Rule actors who pursue self-interest subject to the moral rule of not harming others ("do not take benefits at the expense of others") would set 5 y = ; see Rabin (1995) .
(vi) Impure utilitarians maximise a weighted sum of payoffs. In the quasi-linear case, they set 0 y = or 6; concave valuations of money would generate intermediate choices.
We pursue this case in the next subsection, linking to fairness concern models. • Equilibrium with heterogeneous consequentialist types To analyse the heterogeneous case, we use superscripts A and B to distinguish A and B's We can interpret values of w exceeding unity as inequality aversion, because the fairness concerns model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) reduces to this formulation in our setting: fairness-motivated actors maximise a direct utility from personal material benefits minus a disutility from inequality; since C's payoff is always weakly below A and B's common payoff (for the undominated options with 7 y ≤ ), we only need one of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) 
two inequality aversion parameters; A's utility is then
We now study strategic interactions between A and B. Each actor's preferred outcome is 0 y = if that actor has 5 /12 w = and 6 y = if the actor has 5 /12 w > ; we denote this ideal point by it-or-leave-it proposal to the other. Assuming A and B cannot signal their preferences to each other, the resulting equilibria replicate the equilibrium in the vertical treatment, except that sometimes A and B's roles may be reversed. Since we assign roles and treatments at random, for these equilibria, the distribution of payoff outcomes in V and H are identical. Admittedly, there is greater room for A and B to engage in signalling in H than in V, but when communication is allowed, the signalling possibilities are similar and there exist identical signalling equilibria. This theory of play implies that HwC and VwC will generate the same distribution of payoffs.
Hypothesis 0b:
Under the simplest game-theoretic model of bargaining in HwC (horizontal with chat), the equilibrium outcomes of HwC (horizontal with chat) and VwC (vertical with chat) should be the same.
Our point is not that our hierarchy treatments should have no impact under the enhanced game-theoretic assumptions of altruistic and fairness-motivated actors, but that there is no obvious reason to expect bias in a particular direction; multiple equilibria and dependence on preference distributions make prediction very difficult.
Predicting the impact of communication also requires strong assumptions about the distribution of preference types and specific equilibrium refinements, but for completeness we give a simple example where cheap-talk is likely to have an impact on vertical structures. Suppose that 1 w = with probability p and 0 w = with probability 1 p − . In V, if 1 A w = , then 6 y = since B can never pressure A to reduce y . So we restrict attention to the contingency with 0
), A risks provoking a quit by setting 0 y = . In VwC, any deviation from the putative pooling equilibrium with 0 y = is dominated for the low type subordinate (B with 0 B w = ), but it is "self-signalling" for the high type (B with 1 B w = ) to threaten to quit if y < (1) 10 / 7 y = . So, given that our setting permits "rich-language" communication -see Farrell and Rabin (1996) , we predict the separating equilibrium in which A (restricted to integer values) sets 2 y = when B is high type and otherwise y = 0. Since y equals 0 always in V, the average y in VwC is higher. However, in V, the high type B ends up quitting, so C's average payoff is actually lower in VwC. 15 Meanwhile, if p is high
where pooling is forced), and this pooling outcome is again broken by a self-signalling separation message, now coming from the low type subordinate, that lowers y to 0. The average y is therefore lower in VwC and it does not induce any quits, so C's average payoff is again lower in VwC relative to V. In sum, for this example, communication makes vertical firms behave less sociably. 16
• Psychological considerations
The insights from social psychology allow us to derive much clearer predictions. For expositional coherence, we do so by extending the above model.
A. Perceived responsibility
In the introduction, we argued that A (and similarly for B) will only act to help C if A is positively disposed towards C and feels responsible for what happens to C.
Denoting the feeling of responsibility by r and the disposition by w , A's effective preference is captured by the utility function, . . Control and communication structures can affect both r and w . We discuss them in turn. The evidence described in the introduction suggests that people tend to only feel morally responsible for outcomes over which they have a clear and salient causal responsibility. One possible explanation is that social norms only hold individuals responsible when causal responsibility is obvious, because society seeks to avoid making mistaken accusations; self-serving biases in individual's self-judgements allow a related explanation. The vertical structure V emphasises A's central role in choosing plan y , so subordinates are less likely to feel responsible for what their firms do than are superiors 15 For p < 1/5, C's average payoff given 0 16 The opposite effect is possible; e.g. type separation could force A to raise y above 5 in the more extreme case where w sometimes exceeds 5/4. and we predict ( ) ( ) 
Implications in the homogeneous case: In a homogeneous subject pool, w is fixed but
influences A's choice (B's threat of quitting does not restrict A). The effective concern for C in V is therefore . ( ) By contrast, if one actor is kinder than the other in H, the kinder actor can have a positive influence by threatening to quit. It is easy to see that C may therefore be worse off in V than in H. 18 17 Note that in contrast to Darley and Latané (1968) and others, we fix the number of actors, but changing the organisational structure from V to H does shift the number of actors directly involved in choosing y. A. We therefore expect to observe the following:
Implications in the heterogeneous
Factor 1c: Vertical with chat (VwC) kinder than vertical (V) --voice and responsibility.
Finally, we suggest that perceived responsibility in H will depend on A and B's relative proposals (and messages). In particular, we predict what we call dynamic responsibilityalleviation: if say A proposes a higher plan than B in the first round of proposals, then A can self-justify "compromising" downwards to/towards B's proposal on the grounds that "it was B who first suggested and insisted on being unkind to C". (See below for our nuanced prediction in HwC.)
Factor 1d: In the horizontal treatment (H), A and B's proposals converge asymmetrically with the high-y proposer compromising downwards more than the low-y proposer compromises upwards. 
B. Context-dependent social preferences
We represent the ideas from the introduction by shifts in the value of w; recall that w represents the weight assigned to C's payoff relative to firm profits, whether from altruism or in pursuit of social approval. Factor 2b: The convergence of proposals in HwC could be biased towards either the higher or the lower proposal.
Control structure also matters. First, the need for consensus may engender more communication (via the sequence of proposals) in H; this implies kinder behaviour in H than in V (as a corollary of the argument underlying factor 2a), but communication in H is highly restricted so we do not expect this factor to be particularly strong. Second, we pointed out that A and B are more likely to identify with each other in H where their roles are identical, than in V (where the insider-outsider distinction is less salient and disempowered B may even identify more with powerless C than with the superior A).
Since actors tend to want to help those with whom they identify to the exclusion of others, this insider-outsider effect implies
and similarly for B (as explained on page 12). Clearly this has negative consequences for C:
Factor 2c: V kinder than H (insider-outsider effect).
Verbal communication tends to enhance initial social attitudes. For instance, communication may catalyse bonding between A and B in HwC where they interact as equals, meanwhile the power inequality in VwC may act as a barrier to friendly communication. So the insider-outsider effect is particularly strong in HwC:
Factor 2d: HwC less kind than VwC and H (enhanced insider-outsider effect).
We draw these ideas together in the following conjectures. Responsibility-diffusion (factor 1a) and the (moderate) insider-outsider effect (factor 2c) in H countervail against B's responsibility-alleviation, which is particularly severe in V (factor 1b).
Hypothesis 1: H versus V ambiguous.
The strong insider-outsider effect in HwC (factor 2d), A's central role in VwC ruling out responsibility-diffusion (factor 1a) and B's (verbal) involvement in VwC limiting responsibility-alleviation (factor 1c mitigates factor 1b) all make VwC more favourable to C; note also that the positive effect of A's concentrated responsibility in vertical structures is amplified since A then has the power to raise y as high as A wishes.
Hypothesis 2: VwC kinder to C than is HwC.
Communication enhances ethical outcomes in the vertical firms, because of the mutual reinforcement of factors 1c and 2a; communication makes B feel involved, enhances A and B's concerns for social approval and permits verbalisation of social norms.
Hypothesis 3: VwC kinder than V
We cannot draw a clear comparative prediction for the impact of communication on horizontal firms. The increase in the insider-effect (factor 2d) countervails against the increase in social pressure (factor 2a); furthermore, factor 1c (particularly important to hypothesis 1) does not apply.
Hypothesis 4: HwC versus H ambiguous.
Our final prediction combines factor 1d suggesting dynamic alleviation of high initial proposers in H, with factor 2b recognising the countervailing tendency for actors to be ashamed to voice anti-social thoughts in HwC.
Hypothesis 5:
We expect downward convergence in H but not in HwC.
Experimental Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the Laboratoire d'Economie Expérimentale de Strasbourg (LEES) of the Université Louis Pasteur. Participants were undergraduate students in Business Administration, Economics, Law, Humanities, Science and Engineering. 192 subjects were recruited online by advertisement on campus. This gave 16 observations on groups of 3 subjects in each of the four treatments: H, V, HwC and VwC. At the start of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to cubicles equipped with computer terminals and given instructions that were read aloud. 20 Groups (of 3) and roles within groups (A, B and C) were randomly assigned in each session once subjects had sat in their cubicles. After responding to requests for clarification about the game to be played, we conducted a ten question quiz to check subjects had understood the instructions and we explained all the errors uncovered by the quiz.
To avoid framing effects, we presented the game to subjects in neutral language by referring to participants A, B and C and by asking them to choose or accept a plan numbered between 0 and 10 or to quit the experiment (see screenshots in the Appendix).
The procedures followed in each treatment exactly reproduce the description given in section 2.2. 21 At the end of the experiment, the payoffs earned within a group were revealed to the participants of that group. As C (third-party) participants could lose a maximum of €6, each member of a group was given a capital balance of €7 to ensure a positive payoff from participating in the experiment. Subjects could participate in only one session and their average earnings (which include a €5 show up fee delivered at the 20 See the Appendix for a literal translation of a set of instructions. 21 The experiment requires A and B to validate any apparent consensus in H treatments, in case of mistaken key hits. Subjects were also asked not to reveal their identities or use rude language (and all complied). end of an experimental session) were €13.37 (€15.97 for insiders and €8.18 for third parties). Each session (including time needed to read the instructions) lasted for about thirty minutes.
Results
Most of our conclusions are based on the outcomes of nonparametric randomisation and binomial or Fisher exact tests. 22 We use the α = .10 significance level, but report each test's p-value so the reader can draw conclusions for other significance levels. for our test in terms of payoffs. The modes are at the profit-maximising (y = 0) and welfare-maximising (y = 6) plans. We check to what extent observed behaviour deviates from invariable implementation of the most frequent plan y = 0 (as predicted for rational profit-maximisers). Labelling plans with y > 0 and "Quit" decisions as non-profit- 22 We motivate the use of randomisation tests for independent or related samples by the fact that they use all the information contained in the samples studied (cf. Siegel and Castellan, 1988) .
maximising plans, we test the null that profit-maximising and non-profit-maximising plans are equally likely to be implemented in each treatment, against the alternative that profit-maximising plans are more likely. In no treatment can we reject the null according to one-tailed binomial tests (p-values > .2000), so the data do not support the profitmaximising hypothesis. 23
Another natural division is between harmful outcomes (plans with y < 5) and
harmless outcomes (y ≥ 5 or non-production, denoted "Quit"). According to one-tailed binomial tests, we reject the hypothesis that harmful and harmless outcomes are equally likely in favour of the alternative that harmful plans are more likely to be observed in H, V and HwC (p-values ≤ .0106) but not in VwC (p = .5982). Notice that this appears to contradict the prediction from the game-theoretic analysis of section 2.3, summarised in Hypothesis 0b, that the distribution of equilibrium outcomes will be the same in HwC and
VwC. We now test whether we can attribute this difference to the treatment. Table 1 reports (treatment-) average foregone payoffs of an insider and average payoffs of third parties. Notice that cross-treatment comparisons of insider foregone payoffs do not exactly mirror those of third party payoffs, because the linear relationship is broken by quits and by selection of y > 6. We therefore report tests on both insider and third party outcomes. 
Psychological considerations
Psychological considerations do not predict a clear-cut difference between horizontal and vertical structures in the absence of communication, so the above result (H=V) is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, a comparison of the effect of communication on outcomes in horizontal and vertical organisational structures strongly supports our predictions. First, to follow up on our above finding that harmful outcomes are significantly more likely than harmless outcomes in HwC but not in VwC, we assess the null hypothesis that changing from the organisational structure HwC to VwC has no impact on the probability of harmful outcomes. We reject this null in favour of the alternative that plans are more likely to be harmful in HwC than in VwC (p = .0077, according to a one-tailed 2×2 Fisher exact test). Second, payoff comparison across structures show that insider foregone payoffs are significantly greater in VwC than in HwC and third parties lose significantly less in VwC than in HwC (p = .0066 and p=.0092 respectively, according to one-tailed randomisation tests). In sum: arguments or comments in favour of a group-centred approach (e.g. "Let's ignore the third party"); a discussion is other-regarding if insiders argue in favour of an otherregarding approach (e.g. "Let's maximise social welfare"); we categorise a discussion as unclassified if neither argument is discernible or if both arguments are raised (i.e. one insider favours group-egoism while the other favours altruism). Group-regarding 8 groups {#1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16} A A comparison of the number of words used by each insider in groups with other-and group-regarding discussions (c.f. Table 2 ) reveals that in VwC, insiders of otherregarding groups with use more words than insiders of groups with group-regarding 25 We tried several other more refined codings of subjects' conversation files to identify differences across organisational structures but we only report those that revealed significant differences; see below on "bonding": among group-regarding discussions, A and B appear to be friendlier towards each other in HwC than in VwC (e.g. in Group 4 of HwC, B jokily adopts Master Yoda's (Star Wars) grammar to support A's suggestion to adopt the most harmful plan); this is consistent with our idea that horizontal structures facilitate bonding among insiders and we test it using Table 3 below. discussions (p = .0571 for bosses and p = .0286 for subordinates, one-tailed randomisation tests; in HwC, the p-values equal .2222 for A and B). This is in line with the idea that insiders who plan to be kind enjoy expressing their kind thoughts while cynical insiders avoid discussions that might trigger a guilty conscience.
Table 3: Bonding and group/other-regarding discussions
Groupregarding
Otherregarding Unclassified HwC Bonding 1(0); 4(0); 9(0); 11(0); 12(0);16 (0) No bonding 3(0); 7(2) 10(5) 5(0); 6(2); 14(3); 15 (3) No comm. 2(0); 8(1); 13 (0) VwC Bonding 7 (0) No bonding 4(0); 11(0); 12(0) 2(6); 3(6); 5(6); 9(6); 1(1); 8(Q); 14 (0) No comm. 6(0); 10(Q); 13(6); 15(3); 16 (5) Note: Group identities and (in parenthesis) implemented plan number, with Q standing for Quit.
To study the extent of bonding between insiders, we define discussions with "bonding" as those where the insiders demonstrate a clear predisposition towards mutual identification by using the word "we" to refer to only themselves (not themselves plus the third party) and by not distinguishing internal preference differences (c.f. "your" versus "my" interest). This (admittedly imperfect) definition of bonding gives the classification reported in Table 3 on which we conduct three simple tests based on simple counts of: (i) the number of groups with bonding instead of no bonding in HwC and VwC (6 out of 13 and 1 out of 11, respectively); (ii) the number of groups that have group-regarding instead of other-regarding or unclassified discussions among the bonding and no bonding groups of HwC (6 of 6 and 2 of 7, respectively); (iii) the number of groups that generate profit-maximising instead of non-profit-maximising outcomes among the bonding and no bonding groups of HwC (6 of 6 and 2 of 7, respectively). In each case, using one-tailed 2×2 Fisher exact tests, we reject the null of no relationship in favour of the following alternative hypotheses: (i) bonding is more likely in HwC than VwC (p = .0595); 26 (ii) in 26 We classify neutral communications as no bonding unless both parties are friendly and relaxed with each other (group 12 of HwC is affected). If instead we proxy for bonding by friendly and relaxed (humorous) HwC, groups with bonding are significantly more likely to have group-regarding discussions (p = .0163); (iii) in HwC, groups with bonding are significantly more likely to generate the profit-maximising outcome (p = .0163).
As for the ethical superiority of VwC over V, we first test this hypothesis in terms of implemented plans. We reject the null that the probability of harmful outcomes in a vertical structure is independent of whether communication is allowed in favour of the alternative that plans are more likely to be harmful in V than in VwC (p = .0675, according to a one-tailed 2×2 Fisher exact test). Second, in terms of payoffs, we find that V leads to significantly lower insider foregone payoffs and significantly lower third party payoffs than VwC (p = .0500 and p = .0804 respectively, according to one-tailed randomisation tests). So by all three tests, the data supports our hypothesis that a vertical structure without communication is less kind to third parties than a vertical structure where communication is allowed:
Observation 3: As predicted by Hypothesis 3, in a vertical structure, communication between insiders favours ethical outcomes: VwC generates more ethical outcomes than does V.
In line with Hypothesis 4, the conduct of similar tests on the data of treatments with horizontal structures indicates no sharp differences between H and HwC. Indeed, we find no significant difference between H and HwC in the likelihoods of observing harmful and harmless plans (p = .3503, according to a two-tailed Fisher 2×2 exact test), nor in terms of payoffs (p = .4246 for insider foregone payoffs and p = .2689 for third party payoffs, according to two-tailed randomisation tests). So we conclude:
Observation 4: As predicted by Hypothesis 4, in a horizontal structure, communication between insiders does not affect ethical outcomes: HwC generates neither more nor less ethical outcomes than H.
The repeated interaction between insiders in horizontal treatments provides valuable data for studying the dynamics of responsibility-alleviation. Negotiation length varies across groups, so we focus on how the last proposals compare to the first ones. We discussions, the counts are almost identical. Arguably, one could categorise non-communication as no bonding; the results are then even more significant (we would then reject the null at p = .0415).
need an index that measures the extent to which a participant's final proposal resists compromising towards the other's first proposal. Unless consensus is immediate, one participant makes a higher first foregone payoff proposal than the other; we call the high proposers, the kind proposer, and the low proposer, the unkind proposer. Excluding cases with immediate consensus, we then define the resistance indices of kind and unkind proposers as 27 These comparisons are not affected by the measure used (i.e. plan numbers, insider foregone payoffs or third-party losses), so to avoid additional notation, we use plan proposals y . Immediate consensus ( 1 1 i j y y = ) occurred in Groups 3, 8, 14 and 16 of H, and Groups 2, 5, 9 and 16 of HwC). We also excluded groups (Group 2 of H and Group 13 of HwC) where one insider's final proposal was more extreme than either initial proposal (i.e. outside the range described by the initial proposal pair). Table 4 reports average statistics of these indices and Figure 2 the histograms of differences unkind kind ρ ρ − in H and in HwC. We test the null that these differences have mean 0. For the H sessions only, we reject this null in favour of the alternative that the differences are positive (p = .0488 while in the HwC sessions, p = .3420; one-tailed onesample randomisation tests). According to this test, unkind proposers resist more than do kind ones when (verbal) communication is impossible; with communication, the asymmetry in resistance is insignificant. We also test for cross-treatment differences in the indices of the kind (or equivalently unkind) proposer. The greater resistance of kind proposers in HwC relative to H is consistent with factor 2d, but the difference is insignificant (p = .1973, one-tailed randomisation test). 28
Observation 5: As predicted by Hypothesis 5, horizontal structures display dynamic responsibility-alleviation (i.e. unkind proposers resist compromising more than do kind proposers), but not when communication is allowed.
The data on decisions to quit is potentially useful too. There were no quits in either horizontal treatment (neither H nor HwC) -there, both insiders have the power to use their proposals (and refusal to concede) to prevent excessive harm to the third party. 29
More interestingly, we observe two quits in VwC and none in V. The fact that subordinates seem more willing to pay the implied costs of quitting in VwC than in V (even controlling for the proposal by superiors) supports our idea (factor 1c) that voice is a form of involvement and leads subordinates to feel more responsible. However, the difference in quit rates is not significant (equilibrium quit rates are always low, because quitting is costly for quitters and superiors). So this only offers weak evidence in direct support of factor 1c. Nonetheless, we believe that factor 1c is the driving force behind the positive impact of communication on vertical structures (see Observation 3 and
Hypothesis 3), because if the alternative contender, factor 2a were strong, HwC would give kinder outcomes than H (c.f., Observation 4) and kind first proposers would resist more in HwC than in H (c.f., insignificance of test just prior to Observation 5).
Time differences
Organisational structure and communication affect how long it takes to implement a plan.
Reaching a consensus takes time, so we expect horizontal structures to be more time- Our data supports these straightforward conjectures. The first row of Table 5 reports the average total time needed to implement a plan. First, absent communication, the time taken to implement a plan is significantly greater in horizontal than vertical structures (p = .0818, one-tailed randomisation test). Second, allowing communication significantly increases total time in vertical structures (p = .0011, one-tailed) but not in horizontal structures (p = .4270, one-tailed); consistent with the substitution idea, in horizontal structures, the average number of proposals falls from 6.23/session to 2.38/session when communication is introduced. Third, the time-advantage of vertical over horizontal structures disappears when communication is allowed (p = .1309, onetailed). 30 
Conclusion
Our experimental analysis shows that decision-making processes can have significant effects on distributive outcomes in an abstract economic setting. Great caution should be exercised in applying these results to draw lessons for the impact in real-world organisations, but our conjectures and experimental results identify forces for fieldresearch to look out for.
In our data, communication among insiders has a powerful effect on group ethics.
In vertical structures, communication leads to significantly more ethical behaviour. This supports our conjecture that having voice leads subordinates to feel responsible for outcomes instead of blaming anti-social decisions on their bosses (as suggested by earlier evidence of responsibility-alleviation). Communication also appears to increase social approval concerns (the "observer effect") and it permits verbalisation of norms.
Norms of self-interest (e.g. Ayn Rand's objectivist ethics) or profit-maximisation (see Friedman (1970) ) might encourage group egoism, but our bargaining data suggest that verbal communication encourages individuals to express support for generous norms or remain silent (as in social comparison theory); indeed, communication counteracts the dynamic alleviation of responsibility in horizontal structures (whereby kinder proposers readily "compromise" to the less kind proposal of their colleagues, apparently blaming these colleagues for the unkindness). Notice also that Friedman's (1970) norm of profitmaximisation does not apply to business contexts in which the law must be broken to increase profits, as with illegal but safely hidden pollution or intentional accounting distortions (that hurt passive shareholders).
In our horizontal structures, communication neither increases nor decreases group kindness. We attribute this to the insider-outsider effect: communication catalyses the tendency for insiders to care about each other to the exclusion of outsiders. In vertical structures by contrast, the sharp difference in power of superior and subordinate appears to inhibit mutual identification and the tendency towards bonding. 31
Our second main finding is that, with communication, vertical structures generate greater social responsibility than do horizontal structures. Vertical structures concentrate control in the hands of the superior who suffers neither responsibility-alleviation nor responsibility-diffusion. In the horizontal structures, the sharing of control among insiders leads to responsibility-diffusion so that neither insider feels as responsible as does the superior in a vertical structure. Without communication, however, our comparison of these two control structures reveals no significant difference -absent communication, the insider-outsider effect has less impact (on horizontal structures) and
responsibility-alleviation of subordinates has greater impact (in vertical structures).
One should be careful about extrapolating from this data. The bargaining data are particularly instructive, but we still cannot unambiguously determine exactly which of the factors described drives each specific result. In particular, this study cannot answer the 31 Notice, however, that insider-outsider effects may apply in real-world vertically-structured firms, because there are usually many workers at the same level and sometimes multiple superiors at the same level (as when a board of directors makes a decision); furthermore, other factors may drive social identification.
question of whether the intuitions of corporate reformists, such as Dahl, are valid or not.
The ethical outcomes under vertical structures with communication might appear to contradict their specific intuitions about hierarchy, but as we noted, hierarchies often restrict subordinates' abilities to communicate with bosses. Furthermore, a myriad of issues remain to be covered; for instance, in our study, the selection of superiors and subordinates is random, whereas in reality, hiring and promotion processes are likely to select profit-focussed actors into superior positions. Nonetheless, our study represents a first attempt to shed light on the role of organisational structure and communication in the determination of the ethical behaviour of a group such as a firm. As such, we believe it already provides interesting new results and insights that may entice further research.
At any time during the 600 seconds of play, each participant (A or B) can quit the experiment either by clicking the "Quit" button, or by clicking the "Stop the experiment and quit". In either case, the experiment stops and the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B et C.
The computer displays the proposal of participant A in dark blue and that of participant B in dark red. The next-to-last proposals of A and B appear light blue and light red, respectively.
The experiment continues as long as the 600 seconds time delay has not been reached or as long as no participant chooses to quit. If no agreement has been reached within this time delay, the experiments ends and the gains of the three participants A, B and C are equal to zero.
At any time during the experiment, the time left to agree on a plan is displayed in the upper left corner of the computer screen. The count-down starts as soon as the first propositions of A and B are displayed on their respective computer screens.
Participant C has no decision to take and does not know the proposals made participants A and B. S/he is only asked to answer the questions that appear on his/her computer screen. Answering these questions has no effect on gains nor on the experiment's results. You are not allowed to use the electronic mail system to send insulting messages, or messages that identify you (name, surname or nickname) or which help to identify you (age, ethnic origin, religion, profession, etc.).
Total Gain:
The gains associated to each plan are expressed in Euros (€). At the outset of the experiment, each of you will receive a capital balance of 7 Euros. Your total reward for participating in this experiment will be equal to 7 Euros plus the gain made in this experiment or to 7 Euros minus the loss made in this experiment.
Questionnaire : Before starting the experiment, and once you will be assigned to a computer terminal, we will ask you to answer a questionnaire about these instructions. Answering this questionnaire does not interfere with the experiment.
If you have a question, ask it to one of the administrator in the laboratory, not to another participant. In this experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. To each plan corresponds :
INSTRUCTIONS (Vertical Treatment)
• a gain which is the same for participants A and B, • a gain for participant C which may represent a loss (a negative gain).
or 2) Quit the experiment by clicking the "Quit" button and by validating the choice made. In this case, the experiment ends and the gains are equal to zero for the three participants A, B and C.
Participant B has two options. S/he can : 1) Accept the plan proposed by participant A by clicking the "Accept" button. In this case, the plan is implemented, the experiment ends and the corresponding gains are distributed to participants A, B and C.
Participant C has no decision to take and does not know the proposals made participants A and B. S/he is only asked to answer the questions that appear on his/her computer screen. Answering these questions has no effect on gains nor on the experiment's results.
Participants A, B and C know the gains associated to each plan. You are not allowed to use the electronic mail system to send insulting messages, or messages that identify you (name, surname or nickname) or which help to identify you (age, ethnic origin, religion, profession, etc.).
Total Gain:
Questionnaire: Before starting the experiment, and once you will be assigned to a computer terminal, we will ask you to answer a questionnaire about these instructions. Answering this questionnaire does not interfere with the experiment.
If you have a question, ask it to one of the administrator in the laboratory, not to another participant. In this experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants.
Screenshots (V and VwC)
Screenshots (H and HwC)
Transcripts of Chat log files in HwC
HwC, Group 1 -A: >should it be a plan such that the payoffs are the same for all ? -A: >or the one that makes us earn most ? VwC, Group 2 -B: >hello -A: >hello -A: >I haven't finished analysing the different gains -B: >take your time.
-A: >thanks -A: >so, we both have the same gain, it can go from 0 to 5 -B: >that's correct -B: >what do you choose? -A: >the more we win and less C wins -A: >do you mind if C has a negative gain ? -B: >in general, i prefer equity! -A: >i share your point of view -A: >so, our gains range from 0 to 2.5 -B: >yes -B: >the game wants us to give him the maximum gain while trying to maximise our gains too -A: >it's not the game that wants us to give the maximum gain -A: >we could very well be completely selfish -B: >yes we could -B: >but i'm not in favour of this choice -A: >fine -B: >then you choose first -B: >"with peace in your mind"! -A: >would plan 5 be fine with you, given that it's a dry run for C -B: >i have mixed feelings -A: >what would you like for C? -B: >it's the best solution for us but C finds himself at the same point as before the experiment -B: >i think that with more or less 50 cents, we could consider a positive gain for C -B: >by choosing plan 6 -A: >"the best solution for us" is not plan 6 but plan 0 -B: >of course, but that's not fair.
-A: >absolutely, but it's only an experiment .... -B: >we were given these roles at random, we could have been C! -A: >absolutely, i wonder what this player is doing right now... -B: >wonder if we are going to be selfish or if we are going to thinking about him, may be! -A: >would you be ready to refuse again greater than 2, by concern for equity ? -B: >yes -A: >bravo -B: >and you? -A: >if i were at your place ??? -B: >yes -A: >yes, i think, i wouldn't like to be C -B: >i agree! -A: >so i suggest plan 6 -B: >i agree for plan 6 -A: >no regret ???? plan 6 and no other -B: >no, no regret.
Plan 6
